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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20010514-CA 
VICTOR MANUAL RODRIGUEZ, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction entered pursuant to an unconditional guilty plea 
to possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (Supp. 2001). This Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction over appeals from convictions for second degree felonies. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the validity of defendant's guilty plea 
where he did not file a timely motion to withdraw his plea? 
Standard of Review: Because this issue was not presented to the trial court, there is 
no applicable standard of review. However, whether a court has jurisdiction presents a pure 
legal question. See State v. One 1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 26,1J 8, 21 P.3d 212. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999) 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under rule 65B, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendant, an illegal alien, was arrested when police discovered 37 balloons 
containing cocaine and heroin in his mouth. See Information at 2; PH:7. 
An information, filed on 25 January 2001, charged defendant with two counts of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, both second degree felonies. 
See Information. On 27 March 2001, defendant pled guilty to the first count in exchange for 
the dismissal of the second. See PH:10-11. 
^he record in this case has not been paginated. Record cites to the pleadings file 
will therefore be to the title of the document and the internal page number, where 
applicable. There are only two transcript volumes: the plea hearing and the sentencing 
hearing. Citations to the plea hearing transcript will appear as "PH" followed by the 
internal page number, e.g., PH:3. Citations to the sentencing hearing will appear as %4SFF 
followed by the internal page number, e.g., SH:5. 
2 
Plea Hearing 
Defendant was represented by counsel at the plea hearing. PH:2. A certified court 
Spanish interpreter translated the proceedings for defendant. PH:2-3, 5-6. Before accepting 
defendant's plea, the trial court ascertained through a colloquy that defendant understood the 
charges against him and that he was giving up several constitutional rights by pleading guilty, 
including the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, the right to call and cross-examine 
witnesses, the presumption of innocence, and the right to have the State prove his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. PH:7-8. Defendant told the trial court he had discussed his 
constitutional rights with his attorney and that he was satisfied with counsel's representation. 
PH:5. Defendant's attorney also represented to the court that he had discussed defendant's 
constitutional rights with him and that counsel believed defendant understood what he was 
waiving by pleading guilty. PH:7. 
The trial court explained that defendant's right to appeal a guilty plea was "very 
limited," and that by pleading guilty to a second degree felony, he risked a prison sentence 
of one-to-fifteen years, a $10,000 fine, and an 85 per cent surcharge. PH:8-10. The trial 
court then stated its intent to order a presentence report and explained that the sentencing 
judge would be "the person who determines the type of sentence you will receive." PH:9. 
The prosecutor interposed, stating he understood the matter to be a simple "plead and 
deport" and that a presentence report was unnecessary "because our recommendation is that 
he spend 30 days and be deported." PH:9. Defense counsel, however, insisted that a 
3 
presentence report be prepared before sentencing. Id. Turning to defendant, the trial court 
said, 
Mr. Rodriguez, it's been brought to my attention that part of the 
recommendation will be that at sentencing you will be permitted to be deported 
from the United States. That's not something I am going to address today, but, 
certainly, it is something that the sentencing judge will address. Your 
obligation is to come back to court for that sentencing. You are aware of that; 
are you not? 
PH:10. Defendant replied he understood. Id. 
Defendant confirmed that no one had threatened or forced him to plead guilty and that 
no promises had been made to him, other than dismissal of the second count. PH:10. The 
trial court then witnessed defendant sign a statement, written in both Spanish and English, 
affirming that defendant understood the charges and all the constitutional rights he was 
waiving by pleading guilty. Id.; see also Statement of Defendant, reproduced in Addendum 
A. The written statement included all the advisements required by rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. Pro. 1 l(e-g). 
Defendant's counsel also signed the statement, certifying that defendant had read the 
statement or had it read to him, that counsel had discussed the statement with defendant, and 
that counsel believed defendant fully understood its contents. Add. A. The prosecutor and 
trial court also signed the statement, and the trial court expressly incorporated the written 
statement into the court record. PH: 11. 
The trial court told defendant he had 30 days in which to file a motion to withdraw 
his plea. PH:11. 
4 
Sentencing Hearing 
Defendant was sentenced on 18 May 2001. See Minutes - Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment. The presentence report ("PSF) recommended the statutory prison sentence 
and that prior to his release, defendant be referred to INS for deportation. PSI at 10. The PS I 
rejected probation as a viable option given defendant's illegal status in the United States. Id. 
at 9. 
Defendant's counsel asked the trial court not to impose the recommended prison time: 
When we talked about plea negotiations, what we spoke about, 
although there was no specific commitment to it - Mr. Rodriguez knows that 
he's going to be subject to deportation. We discussed the possibility of a 
nominal amount of local time and an immediate deportation, which he would 
not resist. And, Your Honor, I would submit that rather than the prison that's 
recommended by the Presentence Report, under these circumstances, given the 
total absence of criminal history in this young man's past, that local jail and 
deportation would be appropriate. And we'd ask the Court to impose that 
sentence. 
SH:4 (emphasis added). The prosecutor made no recommendations because he had not yet 
seen the presentence report and could not "speak intelligently to it." SH:4. The prosecutor, 
therefore "[left] it to the Court's discretion and submitted] it on the basis of the report 
without having seen it." SH:4. 
The sentencing court, "astounded" that defendant "had 37 balloons of dope in [his] 
mouth," imposed the statutory prison term of one-to-fifteen years with the proviso that he be 
deported once he served his time. SH:5. At no time during the sentencing hearing did 
defendant or his counsel allege that the prosecutor had promised to make any specific 
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recommendations or that defendant believed that the tnal court would be bound by any 
recommendations. 
Defendant obtained new counsel and, within 30 days of sentencing, filed a notice of 
appeal on 12 June 2001. See Notice of Appeal, reproduced in Addendum B. On 6 July 
2001, defendant filed an application for certificate of probable cause with the district court. 
See Application for Certificate of Probable Cause. In his application, defendant argued that 
he had a substantial likelihood of succeeding on appeal for essentially the same reasons 
contained in his brief. See id.; Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Application 
for Certificate of Probable Cause. 
According to an unsigned minute entry, the trial court held oral argument on the 
application for probable cause and denied it. See Minutes - Law & Motion, dated 17 October 
2001. That minute entry also states that oral argument was heard on a "motion to set aside 
guilty plea," and that the motion was denied. Id. No written motion to set aside or to 
withdraw the guilty plea appears in the record, nor does the transcript of the hearing on 
defendant's application for a certificate of probable cause. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By statute, a defendant's right to move to withdraw a guilty plea is limited to thirty 
days after entry of the plea. The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that a plea is entered 
for purposes of a motion to withdraw at the time defendant's sentence is entered. Failure to 
file a timely motion to withdraw a plea in the district court "extinguishes a defendant's right 
to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on appeal," and therefore deprives the appellate 
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court of jurisdiction to review such a challenge. State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, *| 3, 439 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 28. Because defendant, by his own concession, did not file a timely motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the validity of his 
plea. The plain error doctrine, an exception to the preservation rule, cannot confer 
jurisdiction on this Court where none exists. Defendant has waived his constitutional 
challenge to the 30-day limitations period. In any event, he has not shown how the 30-day 
limitations period is unconstitutional under either the federal or state constitutions. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE VALIDITY 
OF DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE HE DID NOT FILE A 
TIMELY MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA IN DISTRICT 
COURT; DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN HOW THE STATUTORY 
TIME PERIOD FOR FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A PLEA IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Defendant asks this Court to set aside his guilty plea on two grounds: (1) the trial 
court did not strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in taking his 
plea, Br. Aplt. at 9-20; and (2) his plea was not knowing or voluntary because he was "either 
led to believe or at a minimum, was allowed to believe he would only serve thirty days [and] 
then be deported." Br. Aplt. at 22-23. Defendant acknowledges that he did not file a timely 
motion to withdraw his plea with the trial court, but contends that this Court may 
nevertheless review the validity of his plea for plain error. Br. Aplt. 8-9. Alternatively, 
defendant challenges the constitutionality of the statutory 30-day time limit for moving to 
withdraw a guilty plea. 
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As explained below, absent a timely motion to w ithdraw a guilty plea, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to review the validity of that plea, even for plain error. Defendant waived his 
constitutional claim by not raising it below. Even if defendant had preserved his 
constitutional challenge, he has not shown how the statutory 30-day limitations period 
violates any federal or state constitutional provision. 
A. Under recent controlling precedent this Court lacks jurisdiction to review 
defendant's guilty plea. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (1999) provides that a guilty plea may be withdrawn 
only upon a showing of good cause. A request to withdraw a guilty plea must be "made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea." Id. This Court held in 
State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 581-82 (Utah App. 1992), that the statutory 30 days ran from 
the date of the plea hearing in which the court accepted the defendant's plea. The Price court 
also held that so long as the defendant was informed of it, the 30-day limitations period was 
jurisdictional. Id. at 583-84. In other words, failure to file a timely motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea deprived both the trial court and the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain that 
motion. Id. A year later, the Utah Supreme Court implicitly agreed with Price's 
jurisdictional ruling when it held that the statutory period limited "a defendant's right to 
withdraw his or her guilty plea to thirty days after entry of the plea," and thereafter 
"extinguished]" the right. State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993). 
In State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, H 8, 996 P.2d 1065 {Ostler I), this Court held that 
although the 30-day limitations period was jurisdictional, and although the defendant there 
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had not timely moved to withdraw his plea, it could nevertheless review the validity of the 
guilty plea for plain error or exceptional circumstances. The Utah Supreme Court granted 
certiorari review and overruled Price's holding that the 30-day limitations period ran from 
the date of the plea colloquy. State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68,111, 31 ?-3d 528 {Ostler II). The 
Ostler II Court instead held that a plea was not entered until entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, and that the 30-day statutory period therefore ran from the date of sentencing. 
Id. at H 8-11. Because Ostler had filed a motion to withdraw his plea within 30 days after 
sentencing, his motion was timely and the supreme court affirmed Ostler /"only as to result, 
without comment on its [plain error] analysis." Id. at ^ j 13. The Ostler IIopinion, however, 
compared the statutory 30-day limitation period to the 30-day time limit for filing a notice 
of appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari under rules 4 and 48, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, both considered to be jurisdictional time bars. Id. at 11 n.3. See also Price, 837 
P.2d at 582-83 (also comparing the statutory limitations period to those contained in rules 4 
and 48). 
In State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392, ffl[ 7,436 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, on which defendant 
relies, this Court concluded that since Ostler I had not been "clearly overruled by Ostler //," 
it could still review "a plain error claim based on a violation of Rule 11," even though the 
defendant had never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This Court observed, 
however, that "[g]iven the supreme court's references to Rules 4 and 48 [in Ostler / / ] , the 
plain error exception recognized in Ostler I may surely be questioned/' Melo, 2001 UT App 
392.1[5,n.4. 
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After defendant filed his brief, the Utah Supreme Court issued State v. Reyes, 2002 
UT 13,439 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, and explicitly stated what was implicit in Ostler II. (A copy 
of Reyes is contained in Addendum C). The Reyes Court held that it did not have 
jurisdiction to address defendant's challenge to the validity of his guilty plea because 
defendant had not filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, If 3. The 
Court explained that the failure to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea within the statutory 
30-day period "extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea 
on appeal." Id. (citing to State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993,995 (Utah 1993); Ostler II, 2001 UT 
68, If 10; State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993)). 
Reyes argued, as defendant does here, that the Court could nevertheless review his 
guilty plea if plain error or exceptional circumstances existed. Reyes, at 1f 4. The supreme 
court categorically rejected that argument, explaining that while an appellate court "may 
choose to review an issue not properly preserved for plain error," it could not "use plain error 
to reach an issue over which it has no jurisdiction." Id. 
Reyes is dispositive. Defendant concedes that he did not file a timely motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.2 Like Reyes, he argues only that this Court may still review his 
challenge to the validity of his guilty plea for plain error. Br. Aplt. 8-9, 14-15, 20-21, 23-24, 
2As noted above, the record suggests that after filing his notice of appeal, 
defendant at one point made an oral motion to set aside his guilty plea, which the trial 
court denied in an unsigned minute entry on 17 October 2001. See Minutes - Law & 
Motion, dated 17 October 2001. Defendant does not mention making this motion nor 
does he claim that it amounted to a timely motion to withdraw his plea. 
10 
25-26. As Reyes explained, however, plain error is nothing more than an exception to the 
preservation rule which prevents an appellate court from reaching an issue not raised in the 
trial court. Reyes, at % 4; see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1j 12, 10 P.3d 346 (general 
preservation rule, that claims not raised in trial court may not be raised on appeal, applies to 
every claim, unless a defendant can show that "exceptional circumstances" exist or that 
"plain error" occurred). As such, plain error cannot be used to cure a jurisdictional defect. 
Reyes, at ^ 4.3 
Defendant nevertheless suggests that his appeal "is in essence a motion to withdraw 
[his] guilty plea," filed in the appellate court. Br. Aplt. 28. To the extent defendant is asking 
this Court to treat his notice of appeal as a timely motion to withdraw his plea, he has 
presented no factual or legal basis for this Court to do so. Nothing in the notice of appeal 
suggests that it is anything different than its caption indicates. It does not state, or even 
imply, that defendant seeks to withdraw his plea or that good cause exists for allowing him 
3Defendant has only sought review of his guilty plea for plain error and has not 
argued that he is entitled to appellate review under the "exceptional circumstances" 
doctrine. See Br. Aplt. 8-9, 14-15, 20-21, 23-24, 25-26. Even if defendant had argued 
exceptional circumstances, the analysis in Reyes would still preclude review of the 
validity of defendant's plea. Exceptional circumstances, like plain error, is no more than 
an exception to the preservation rule, and therefore cannot be used to cure a jurisdictional 
defect. Cf. Reyes, at K 4; State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231-32 (Utah App. 1991) 
(finding exceptional circumstances excused defendant's fa ilure to raise a claimed error 
at the trial level where then-existing case law would have made raising the issue futile). 
Other than Ostler I, which Reyes has now effectively overruled, the State could find no 
case in which a Utah appellate court used plain error, exceptional circumstances, or any 
other exception to the preservation rule to reach an issue over which it did not have 
jurisdiction. 
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to do so. To treat defendant's notice of appeal as a properly and timely filed motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea would be nothing more than to improperly circumvent the 
jurisdictional requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 and Reyes. Furthermore, 
it is telling that defendant concedes he never filed a motion to withdraw his plea, thereby-
acknowledging that his notice of appeal was only what it purported to be - a notice of appeal. 
Even if defendant's notice of appeal could somehow be construed as a motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea, it would not be for this Court to rule on that motion. Rather, it would be for 
the district court to grant or deny it. See Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343-45 (Utah App. 
1988) (the two ways to attack a guilty plea are (1) directly, in context of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea, the denial of which may be appealed, or (2) collaterally, through a 
post-conviction petition). 
In sum, under Reyes, this Court lacks jurisdiction to address the validity of defendant's 
guilty plea where, by his own admission, he has not filed a timely motion to withdraw his 
pica. Plain error, an exception to the preservation rule, cannot confer jurisdiction where there 
is none. 
B. Defendant waived his constitutional challenge to the 30-day limitations period; 
in any event he has not shown the limitation period is unconstitutional. 
For the first time on appeal, defendant alternatively argues that the "portion of the 
statute [Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b)] limiting the time to withdraw a guilty plea to thirty 
days from the date of the plea should be found unconstitutional." Br. Aplt. 26 (emphasis 
added). Defendant contends that this aspect of the statute violates his right to equal 
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protection and due process under both the federal and state constitutions because "a 
defendant may discover errors only after it is too late to remedy the problem." Br. Aplt. 26. 
Defendant compares the 30-day limitations period to a statute of repose because it cut off his 
right to move to withdraw before he could discover the alleged defect in his plea. Id. 
As a general rule, a defendant is barred from raising an issue, even constitutional 
questions, for the first time on appeal. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah 1993); State 
v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). "An appellate court may address a 
constitutional issue for the first time on appeal if: (1) the trial court committed 'plain error;' 
or (2) there are 'exceptional circumstances.'" Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922. What 
constitutes "exceptional circumstances" has not be well-defined by case law, however, the 
doctrine has been described as "a safety device to make certain that manifest injustice does 
not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal." Id. at 923. 
Defendant argues that exceptional circumstances excuse his failure to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute below because of a "rare procedural anomaly" created by then-
existing case law. Br. Aplt. 27-28. Defendant essentially argues that he could not have filed 
a timely motion to withdraw his plea because he could not have known of any of the alleged 
defects in his plea until sentencing, which occurred more than 30 days after the plea hearing 
- the date from which the 30-days ran under both Price and Ostler I. Br. Aplt. 26-27. 
Defendant claims that the trial judge's warning that he had only 30 days from the date of the 
plea hearing to withdraw his plea, in conjunction with then-existing case law, "tricked, 
bamboozled, led [him] astray and induced" him to forego filing a motion to withdraw his plea 
13 
and to instead simply file a notice of appeal. Defendant asserts that had he known Ostler II 
would have permitted him to file a motion to w ithdraw his plea within 30 days of sentencing, 
he would have done so. Br. Aplt. 27. 
Defendant's assertions, however, do not present any exceptional circumstances that 
warrant this Court addressing the constitutionality of the 30-day limitation period for the first 
time on appeal. Contrary to defendant's assertions, nothing in the trial court's advisement 
or then-existing case law prevented him from raising his constitutional argument below. 
As a preliminary matter, defendant need not resort to his constitutional challenge with 
respect to his claims that the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11 because those 
claims should have been at least as apparent to him as he now claims it should have been to 
the trial court. Certainly, he could and should have discovered any alleged rule 11 violations 
within 30 days of the plea hearing. Thus, irrespective of Ostler /, he was on notice that he 
only had 30 days from the plea hearing to move to withdraw his plea. If he had done so, his 
motion would have been timely under both Ostler I and Ostler II* 
4In making this argument, the State does not concede that the trial court did not 
strictly comply with rule 11. A review of the colloquy as well as the written statement 
demonstrates that in fact the trial court strictly complied with rule 11. See State v. 
Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1992) (plea affidavits properly incorporated into the 
record may be used to demonstrate strict rule 11 compliance); see also State v. Penman, 
964 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Utah App. 1998) (resorting to defendant's written statements in 
addition to court's colloquy to determine strict rule 11 compliance). Defendant seeks to 
avoid the thoroughness of the written statement he signed in open court by arguing the 
trial court had not properly incorporated into the record. Br. Aplt. 9-15. The record 
refutes that claim. The trial court asked defendant if he had discussed his rights with his 
attorney, recessed so that defendant could have additional discussions with his attorney, 
and specifically referred to the statement before defendant signed it. PH:4-8, 10-11. The 
14 
Thus, defendant's constitutional challenge only goes to his claim that his plea 
was rendered unknowing or involuntary at sentencing when he allegedly discovered that the 
sentencing court was not bound by any recommendations. Defendant contends that he could 
not have discovered this claim before sentencing and that by the time he did, the 30 days had 
run and effectively extinguished his claim under then-existing case law. But even assuming 
the truth of defendant's assertion, he was not precluded from arguing to the trial court that 
the 30-day limitations period was unconstitutional. Once defendant believed that his plea 
had been rendered unknowing or involuntary, it behooved him to file a motion to withdraw 
his plea and to argue to the district court that running the 30-day period from the plea hearing 
was unconstitutional under the circumstances. If the district court denied his motion to 
withdraw, defendant could have then appealed and advanced his preserved constitutional 
claim to this Court. 
Defendant's comparison of his situation to a statute of repose only illustrates this 
point. See Br. Aplt. 26-27'. A statute of repose is a limitations period that sometimes has the 
effect of cutting off an injured party's cause of action before it even arises. Craftsman 
statement was in both English and Spanish, and stated that defendant understood its 
contents. See Add. A. Defendant's attorney also signed the statement certifying that 
defendant had read it or had it read him, that they had discussed it, and defendant 
understood its contents. Id. The trial court then expressly stated on the record that it was 
incorporating the written statement into the record. PH: 11. Under the circumstances, 
there can be no question that the written statement was properly incorporated into the 
record and should therefore be considered in determining strict rule 11 compliance. See 
Penman, 964 P.2d at 1161 (holding plea affidavit properly incorporated into record under 
similar circumstances). 
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Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Manufacturing Co., 1999 UT 18, *{\ 14, 974 P.2d 1194; Lee 
v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 576 (Utah 1993). Under certain circumstances, a statute of repose 
may be unconstitutional under our state constitution. See, e.g., Sun Valley Water Beds of 
Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 191-92 (Utah 1989). However, if a 
plaintiff wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a statute of repose that has cut off a 
cause of action, he must first file the action and present his constitutional claim to the trial 
court. If the trial court then dismisses the cause of action as barred by the statute of repose, 
the plaintiff may appeal that dismissal and advance his preserved constitutional claim to the 
appellate court. See Stoker v. Workers'Comp. Fund of Utah, 889 P.2d409,411 (Utah 1994) 
(addressing plaintiffs constitutional challenge to statute of repose, but declining to address 
other constitutional claims not raised before the trial court); see also Craftsman Builder's 
Supply, Inc., 1999 UT 18, ^ 8 (appellant arguing constitutionality of statute of repose had 
made that argument below). 
Thus, the fact that the time for filing a motion to withdraw a plea had already run 
under then-existing case law, did not create a "rare procedural anomaly" that precluded 
defendant from first presenting his constitutional claim to the district court. 
Nor could Ostler I have misled defendant into believing that he did not need to file 
a motion to withdraw or make his constitutional argument to the trial court. As this Court 
explained in Melo, the plain error review permitted in Ostler /applied only to claims based 
on a violation of rule 11, not claims, such as defendant's, that he was induced to plead guilt) 
based on his misunderstanding of the likely outcome at sentencing. Melo, 2001 UT App 392, 
16 
^ 7-8; see also State v. Parnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 1222 (reaching defendant's 
plain error claim based on violations of rule 11, but refusing to extend Ostler I to provide 
plain error review of other legal challenges to a guilty plea).' 
In sum, defendant's failure to file a motion to withdraw his plea does not present any 
exceptional circumstance that excuses his failure to raise his constitutional claim in the trial 
court. Rather, defendant simply did not follow the correct procedure for placing his 
arguments before this Court. 
In any event, defendant's contention that the statute is unconstitutional insofar as it 
limits the time to withdraw a guilty plea to 30 days "from the date of the plea," is moot. 
Ostler //specifically interpreted the statutory phrase "within 30 days after entry of the plea" 
to mean within 30 days after entry of the judgment at sentencing. Ostler II, 2001 UT 68,1ft[ 
8-11. Because the statute does not limit the time to 30 days after the plea hearing, it cannot 
be unconstitutional for that reason. 
More important, defendant has not explained how or why the 30-day limitations 
period is unconstitutional. He merely baldly asserts that the time limitation violates the equal 
"Significantly, Ostler himself did not simply appeal his guilty plea; rather, he filed 
a motion to withdraw his plea within 30 days after sentencing, which under then-existing 
caselaw was untimely. Ostler II, 2001 UT 68, \ 2; Ostler /, 2000 UT App 28, ffif 7-8. 
Ostler appealed from the denial of that motion and, on appeal, challenged Price's holding 
that the 30-day limitations period was jurisdictional and ran from the date of the plea 
hearing. Id. That challenge ultimately led to Ostler IPs holding that the 30-days ran from 
the date of sentencing and that his motion to withdraw was in fact timely. Ostler IP at Ifll 
11-12. As explained, defendant also could have moved to withdraw his plea in distnct 
court. If his motion had been dismissed as untimely, he, like Ostler, could have then 
challenged the limitation period as unconstitutional. 
17 
protection and due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions because "a defendant 
may discover errors only after it is too late to remedy the problem/* Br. Aplt. 26. Defendant 
cites to no authority other than Ostler II to support his assertion, nor does he engage in any 
meaningful legal analysis. Br. Aplt. 26-27'. Defendant's failure to adequately brief this claim 
is an alternative basis for not addressing it for the first time on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9) (requiring appellant's brief to include "contentions and reasons . . . with respect to 
the issues presented . . . with citations to authorities, statutes, and parts of record relied on"); 
Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1996) (declining to review issue not 
adequately bnefed); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (same).6 
6Defendant does not argue that the statutory 30-day limitations period is 
unconstitutional when run from the date of sentencing, as held by Ostler II. Such an 
argument would necessarily fail because defendant has another adequate, statutory means 
for obtaining review of the validity of his guilty plea. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(3) 
provides that the 30-day limitations period "does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned 
person under rule 65[C], Utah Rules of Civil Procedure," which provides the procedure 
for obtaining post-conviction relief. The crux of defendant's claim on appeal is that his 
plea was not knowing or voluntary because he was led to believe that the prosecutor 
would recommend that he spend 30 days in jail and then be deported, and that the 
sentencing court would be bound by that recommendation. Br. Aplt.21 -27. Defendant 
may file a petition for post-conviction relief in the district court seeking to set aside his 
guilty on that basis. See Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1993) (post-
conviction relief will lie if petitioner shows that guilt plea was in fact not knowing and 
voluntary); Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343-34 (Utah App. 1988) (explaining that 
guilty pleas may be collaterally attacked in post-conviction proceeding where a defendant 
did not move to withdraw guilty plea). If the district court denies his petition, he may 
then seek appellate review of that denial. Thus, the 30-day limitations period does not 
work a substantial injustice in this case nor does it deprive defendant of due process or 
equal protection. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the validity of defendant's guilty plea. 
Defendant has waived his constitutional claim and, in any event, has not shown that the 
statutory limitation period for moving to withdraw a guilty plea is unconstitutional. The 
Court should therefore dismiss defendant's appeal. 
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ADDENDUMA 
Defendant's Written Plea Statement 
IN THE DISTRIC T COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL UlSTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
EN EL TRIBUNAL JUDICIAL DEL TERCER DISTRITO 
CONDADO DE SALT LAKE. ESTADO DE UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
EL ESTADO DE UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
El Demandante, 
versus 
contra 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT. 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER 
EL DOCUMENTO DECLARATAORIO DEL 
ACUSADO. LOS CERTIFICADOS DE LOS 
ABOGADOS Y LA ORDEN DEL JUEZ 
CASE NO- OH (JQI 7.7^ 
N° DE CASO 
//VV?9,< /Wrfl/l<ti-Aj)fr&df2? 
Defendant 
El Acusado 
COMES NOW \jl i-^^f f/$ //£/f-rt<(s-'2rthe defendant in this case, and hereby 
acknowledges and certifies the following: ., 
COMPARECE \fJ Q-Jpfi^c'tfCf !£//£& acusado en este caso. y por este medio 
reconoce v certifica lo sisuiente: 
I am entering a plea of guilty to the following crime(s): 
Me declaro culpable del siguiente delito(s): 
CRIME & STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
EL DELITO Y LA DISPOSICION 
ESTABLECIDA POR LA LEY 
DEGREE 
GRADO 
B. 
fir te>firAf>/ifQ StGffnt'-^ 
PUNISHMENT 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
EL CASTIGO 
Minimo, maximo y/o 
minirno oblisatorio nimc 
c. 
I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature 
and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading guilty. 
He recibido una copia del Documento Acusatono, la he leido, y entiendo la naturaleza y los elementos 
del delito(s) por el cual me declaro culpable. 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: - / L J 
Los elementos del delito(s) del cual se me acusa son los siguientes: jf\^^*~*~ "**" '^^^r^^^c/ 
r^j f£/hfcitr f-fc-i'/j £<f/fAfQ/ft^ frs&fjt'i /?-
farm / jjrujfr T?> pjsr/Zj&lh^ 9/^ti £J*&$-^^ . 
My conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable that constitutes 
the elements of the crime(s) charged is as follows: 
Mi conducta y la conducta de otras personas por la cual soy penalmente responsable, y que constitute 
los elementos del delito(s) imputado. es la siguiente: 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the 
following facts: 
Doy entrada a esta declaracion(es) voluntariamente y con el conocimiento y el entendimiento de la 
siguiente informacion: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, 
an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize that a condition of my sentence 
may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
1. Se que tengo el derecho a ser representado por un abogado. y si no tengo los fondos para contratar 
uno. el tribunal me asignara un abogado sin cobrarme. Reconozco que una condicion de nu pena puede ser que 
e^ me requiera pagar una cantidad. determinada por el tribunal, para reembolsar el costo del abogado. si es que 
se me asignara uno. 
2. I (have not) (ham,) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have 
done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
2. (No he) (he) renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado. Si he renunciado al derecho a tener un 
abogado, lo he hecho a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente por las siguientes razones: 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and understand the nature 
and elements of the charges, my rights in this case and other proceedings, and the consequences of my 
plea of guilty. 
3 Si he renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado, he lefdo este documento y entiendo la naturaleza 
y los elementos de los cargos, mis derechos en este ca^o y otros actos procesales, y las consecuenuas de mi 
declaracion de culpabihdad 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
have had an opportunity to fully discuss this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty 
plea with my attorney. o t - )s\ 
4 Si no he renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado, mi abogado p<; £ff!\TC] frj I ^/Tlffih™ 
y he tenido la oportunidad de hablar con mi abogado en detalle sobre este documento, mis derechos v las 
consecuenciab de mi declaracion de culpabihdad 
5. I know that I have a right to a speedy trial in open court by an impartial jury and that I am 
giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
5 Se que tengo el derecho a tener un juicio publico sin demora ante un jurado imparcial > que al 
declararme culpable renuncio a ese derecho 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to compel 
my witness!es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court in my behalf. I understand that I am 
giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
6 Se que si deseo tener un juicio, tengo ei derecho a carear y repreguntar a los testigos en mi contra 
o hacer que mi abogado les repregunte. Tambien se que tengo el derecho a obligar a mis, testigo(s) per medio 
de un citatono costeado por el Estado, a testificar a mi tavor en el tribunal Entiendo que al declararme culpable 
renuncio a estos derechos 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf; but if I choose not to do so, I cannot 
be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself; and no adverse inferences will be drawn against 
me if I do not testify. I understand that I am giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
7 Se que tengo el derecho a testificar a mi tavor pero si ehjo no hacerlo. no se me puede obligar 
a testificar o a dar pruebas en mi contra, y ninguna inierenua destavorabie se sacara en mi contra si no tesufico 
Entiendo que al declararme culpable renuncio a estos derechos 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and the 
matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Ltah will have the burden of proving each element 
of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
8 Se que i^ deseo disputar la acusacion, solo necesito declararme inocente y el asunto se rijara para 
un juicio En el juicio el Estado de Utah tendra la obltgaaon de probar cada elemento de la acusacion sin que 
quepa duda razanoble Si el juicio es ante un jurado el veredicto tiene que ser unanime 
9. I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the right of a presumption of innocence. I 
understand that I am presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if 
this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead guilty. I understand that I give up the right to the presumption 
of innocence if I plead guilty. 
9. Entiendo que como acusado gozo del derecho a la presuncion de inocencia. Entiendo que se supone 
que soy inocente hasta que el Estado pruebe en un juicio ante un jurado que soy culpable sin que quepa duda 
razonable, o hasta que me declare culpable si decido no tener un juicio. Entiendo que renuncio al derecho a la 
presuncion de inocencia si me declaro culpable. 
10. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the 
Judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, 
where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, 
those costs would be paid by the State. I understand that I am giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
10. Se que bajo la Constitucion de Utah, si el jurado o el Juez me enjuiciara y condenara, tendna el 
derecho a apelar mi condena y pena en la Corte de Apelaciones de Utah o, donde se permita. en la Corte 
Suprema de Utah, y si no tuviera los fondos para pagar por los gastos de tal apelacion, esos gastos los pagaria 
el Estado. Entiendo que renuncio a estos derechos si me declaro culpable. 
11. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which I plead guilty. 
I know that by pleading guilty to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence, I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentence 
may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine, an 
eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to 
make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges 
that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this plea agreement. 
11. Se cual es la pena maxima que se puede imponer por cada delito por el cual me declaro culpable. 
Se que al declararme culpable de un delito que lleva una pena minima obligatoria. me estare someuendo a 
cumplir esa pena minima obligatona por ese delito. Se que las penas pueden ser consecutivas v pueden consistir 
en una condena penitenciana. una multa, o ambas. Se que ademas de una multa. se impondra un recargo de 
ochenta y cinco por ciento (85%). Tambien se que el Juez me puede ordenar indemnizar a cualquier \ ictimai s) 
de mis delitos, incluyendo cualquier restitution que se deba en los cargos retirados como resultado de este 
convenio declaratorio. si estos existieran. 
12. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for an additional 
amount if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I pled guilty, my 
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. Se que el encarcelamiento puede ser por penodos consecutivos. o la multa en una cantidad 
adicional. si me declaro culpable de mas de un delito. Tambien se que si estoy bajo libertad conditional 
probatona ("probation"), o libertad preparatory ("parole"), o esperando la imposition de la pena por otro deiito 
del cual he sido condenado o por el cual me he declarado culpable, mi declaration de culpabilidad en la presente 
action puede resultar en que se me impongan penas consecuti\as. 
13. I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up my statutory 
and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such pleais), 
I am admitting and do so admit I have committed the conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the 
crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered. 
15. Se v entiendo que al declararme culpable renuncio a los derecho> legales > constitucionales 
enumerados en los parratos anteriores. Tambien e^ que al dar entrada a tal declaration!es). admito que he 
cometido la conducta que se alega \ que soy culpable del delitoi M por el cual se da entrada a mi declaration!es). 
14. My plea(s) of guilty (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties, and provisions of this plea bargain, if any are fully 
contained in this statement: 
14. Mi declaracion de culpabilidad (es) (no es) el resultado de un convenio delaratorio entre el 
abogado acusador y yo. Las promesas, obligaciones y estipulaciones de este convenio declaratorio, si existen 
algunas, se encuentran en si totalidad en este documento. 
15. I know and understand that any motion to withdraw my plea(s) of guilty must be for good 
cause, in writing, and must be filed within thirty (30) days after entry of my guilty plea. 
15. Se y entiendo que cualquier peticion para retirar mi declaracion* es) de culpabilidad ha de 
interponerse dentro de treita (30) dias despues de dar entrada a dicha declaracion(es), y esto ha de ser por 
escrito. y debe existir causa justaficada. 
16. I know that any charge or sentencing concession, or recommendation of probation or 
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney, is not binding on the Judge. I also know that any opinions 
they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court. 
16. Se que el Juez no tiene que regirse por cualquier concesion de cargo o de pena. o recomendacion 
de libertad condicional probatona o pena suspendida. incluyendo una reduccion de los cargos para la imop^icion 
de la pena hecha o solicitada por el abogado defensor o el abogado acusador. Tambien se que el Juez tampoco 
tiene que regirse por cualquier opinion que me expresen en cuanto a lo que ellos crean que pueda hacer el Juez. 
17. Not threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind has been made to induce me to plead 
guilty, and not promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
17. No se me ha amenazado, coaccionado, o influenciado ilegalmente para inducirme a declararme 
culpable, y no se me ha hecho ninguna promesa excepto las contenidas en este documento. 
18. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand 
its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. I do not 
wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
18. He leido este documento. o mi abogado me lo ha lefdo. y entiendo sus estipulaciones. Se que 
puedo cambiar o tachar cualquier cosa contenida en este documento. No deseo hacer ningiin cambio porque 
todas las afirmaciones son correctas. 
19. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
19. Estoy satisfecho con el asesoramiento v la ayuda de mi abogado. 
20. I am years of age; I have attended school through the grade; and I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided 
to me. I was not under the infuence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my 
judgement when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the influence of any 
drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgement. / 
20. Tengo / Q anos de edad. he asistido a la escuela hasta el C(? grado y puedo leer y entender 
espariol. Si no entiendo ingles, se me ha proporcionado un interprete. No estaba bajo la inrluencia de ninguna 
droga, medicamento o bebida alcoholica que pudiera perjudicar mi criterio cuando se tomo la decision de dar 
entrada a la declaracion(es). Actualmente no estoy bajo la influencia de ninguna droga. medicamento o bebida 
alcoholica que perjudique mi criterio. 
- o -
21. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind; mentally capable of understanding the 
proceedings and the consequences of ray plea; and free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that 
would prevent me from knowingly; intelligently, and voluntarily entering ray plea. 
21. Creo estar en sano juicio, con capacidad mental de entender los actos procesales y las 
consecuencias de mi declaration, y libre de caulquier enfermedad mental, defecto o impedimento que me 
previniera dar entrada a mi declaration a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente. 
22. Other: 
22. Anadido: 
Dated this day of 
Fechado el dia 9 y ^ e » mes te/Tffifcff- de 2*C&/\ 
n :m\uY %O6T'^^LL 
DEFENDANT 
ELACUSADO 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO DEFENSOR 
I certify that I am the attorney for \Jj (^fLf^ /L OlJ^)(^A L. ^ ne defendant above, and 
that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; and I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; 
and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing 
affidavit, are accurate and true. 
Certifico que soy el abogado de , el antedicho acusado(a). y se 
que el (ella) ha leido el documento, o que se lo he leido yo. y lo he discutido con el (ella). y creo que entiende 
el sigmficado del contenido en su totalidad, y creo que esta mental y fisicamente competente. A mi leal saber 
y entender, despues de una investigacion apropiada. los elementos del delitoi's) y la sinopsis tactual de la 
conducta delictiva del acusado estan estipulados correctamente, y estos, junto con las otras proclamaciones y 
aiirmaciones hechas por el acusado en el affidavit anterior, son certen^ y verdaderos. 
trn,-MS / 
El Abosada-del Acusado / N d€ Abosacia 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO ACUSADOR 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's 
criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, 
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. 
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for 
the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the 
public interest. 
Certifico que soy el abogado del Estado de Utah en la causa en contra de 
el acusado. He revisado este Documento Declaratorio del Acusado y encuentro que la base factual de ia 
conducta delictiva del acusado que constiruye el delito es verdadera y correcta. No se le ha ofrecido al acusado 
ningiin incentivo inapropiado, amenaza o coaccion para alentar una declaracion de culpabilidad. Las 
negociaciones declaratonas se encuentran en su totalidad en el Documento y en el Convemo Declaratorio. o 
como complemento en las actas del tibunal. Existe motivo fundado para creer que la prueba respaldana la 
condena del acusado por el delito(s) ante el cual se da entrada a la declaracion(es), y la aceptacion de esta 
declaracion(es) beneficiaria a la ciudadanfa. 
Prosecuting Attorney / Bar No. 
El Abogado Acusador / N de Abosacfa -5r)<o' 
ORDER 
LA ORDEN DEL JUEZ 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and 
counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is freely and 
voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty to the charge(s) set forth in 
the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Basado en los hechos presentados en el Documento anterior y la certificacion del acusado y de los 
abogados. el Juez atestigua las firmas y deternuna que la declaracion(es) de culpabilidad del acusado se hace 
libre y voluntanamente, y asi se ordena que la declaracion(es) de culpabilidad del acusado por el cargoiv) 
expuesto en el Documento sea aceptada y asentada. 
Dated this dl dav of V^iArA^l^ ( . 
Fechado el dia de de 20 . 
'k^HMJ^^> 
STRICT COURT JUDGE 
JUEZ DEL TRIBUNAL DEL DISTRITO 
- 8 -
NOT1CE TO DEFENDANTS LACKING RESIDENCY PAPERS 
AVISO A LOS ACUSADOS QUE NO TBENEN DOCUMENTOS DE RESIDENCIA 
I further understand that if I am in this country illegally, I am subject to deportation by the 
Department of Immigration and Naturalization Service. Further that if I am an alien with legal resident 
status, my staiis may be revoked and I could be subject to deportation. 
Ademas entiendo que si estoy ilegal en este pais, estoy sujeto a ser deportado por el Departamento de 
Inmigracion y Naturalizacion. Por otra parte, si soy un extanjero con un estado de residencia legal, mi estado 
puede ser revocado y puedo ser deportado. 
I further understand that if convicted and deported and I re-enter illegally I am subject to 
prosecution in the federal courts for illegal re-entry if the conviction was a misdemeanor. If the 
conviction was for a felony or a Class A misdemeanor it can be aggravated re-entry. 
Ademas entiendo que si se me condena y deporta por un delito menoir y regreso ilegalmente, estoy 
sujeto a ser procesado en el tribunal federal por reingreso ilegal. Si la condena fue por un delito mayor o por 
un delito menor de clase A, puedo ser procesado por reingreso ilegal con agravantes. 
ADDENDUM B 
Notice of Appeal 
Joseph Jardine # 8889 
JARDINE LAW OFFICES 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 350-3506 
Telefax: (801)534-1948 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEP 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
v.. ) 
) Case No. 011901224 
VICTOR MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, ) 
) Judge: Judith S. Atherton 
Defendant and Appellant ) 
COMES NOW, Joseph Jardine, Attorney at Law, upon the request of Defendant 
Appellant Victor Manuel Rodriguez, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3 and Rule 4 (a) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and hereby gives Notice of Appeal from the 
Judgment and Conviction filed and entered by this Court on May 18, 2001. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i i _ day of June, 2001. 
JARDINE LAW OFFICES 
Joseph Jardine 
Attorney for Victor M. Rodriguez 
ADDENDUM C 
State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 
2002 WL 91642 
439 Utah Adv. Rep. 28. 2002 I T 13 
(Cite as: 2002 WL 91642 (Utah)) 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Javier E. REYES, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 990300. 
Jan. 25, 2002. 
After defendant pled guilty, he filed pro se motion to 
correct an illegal or improper sentence. The Second 
District Court, Davis County, Jon M. Memmott, J., 
denied motion. Defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Howe, C.J., held that: (1) defendant waived 
issue of trial court's denial of motion, and (2) trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to address issue of whether 
trial court, in accepting his plea, had failed to strictly 
comply with rule governing pleas. 
Appeal dismissed. 
West Headnotes 
[11 Criminal Law <S=>1130(2) 
1 lOkl 130(2) Most Cited Cases 
[11 Criminal Law <£=> 1178 
HOkl 178 Most Cited Cases 
By failing to address trial court's denial of his pro se 
motion to correct an illegal or improper sentence in 
his brief or at oral argument, defendant therefore 
waived the issue on appeal. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 
22(e). 
[21 Criminal Law <®=> 1026.10(3) 
110k 1026.10(3) Most Cited Cases 
Because defendant did not move to withdraw his 
guilty plea within 30 days after the entry of the plea, 
appellate court, on appeal of denial of motion to 
correct illegal or improper sentence, lacked 
jurisdiction to address the issue of whether trial court, 
in originally accepting defendant's plea, had failed to 
strictly comply with rule governing pleas. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-13-6; Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 11, 22(e). 
[3] Criminal Law <£=>1030(1) 
110k 1030( 1) Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court may choose to review an issue not 
properly preserved for plain error, but it cannot use 
Page 2 
plain error to reach an issue over which it has no 
jurisdiction. 
Mark L. Shurtleff. Att'y Gen., J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, Carvel R. Harwood, 
Farmington. for plaintiff 
Scott L. Wiggins. Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
HOWE, Chief Justice. 
*1 H 1 In 1991, defendant Javier E. Reyes was 
charged with rape of a child, and sodomy of a child, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-402.1,- 403.1 
(1999). Pursuant to a plea bargain, he pled guilty to 
the charge of rape of a child and the court dismissed 
the sodomy charge. He was sentenced to a term of 
fifteen years to life and began his incarceration. At no 
time since has he sought to withdraw his guilty plea. 
On January 26, 1999, he filed a pro se motion under 
rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
correct an illegal or improper sentence. The trial 
court denied the motion. 
[1] H 2 Reyes now appears before us, ostensibly to 
appeal the trial court's denial of his pro se motion 
pursuant to rule 22(e). However, he has not addressed 
the court's denial of his motion in his brief or at oral 
argument, and therefore waives the issue. DeBry v. 
Cascade Enters., 935 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1997).' 
[2] 1| 3 Instead of focusing on the denial of his rule 
22(e) motion, Reyes attacks his guilty plea, arguing 
that the trial court committed plain error by failing to 
strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. We decline to address this issue 
because we do not have jurisdiction to address it. 
Section 77-13-6 of the Utah Code was amended in 
1989 to require a defendant to file a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea within thirty days after the 
entry of the plea. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999). 
We have held that failure to do so extinguishes a 
defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty 
plea on appeal. See State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 
995 (Utah 1993) (noting that "the plea statute limits a 
defendant's right to withdraw his or her guilty plea to 
thirty days after entry of the plea" and that 
"[thereafter, the right is extinguished"): State v. 
Ostler, 2001 UT 68^11 10, 31 P.3d 528 (noting that 
"because State v Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 
(Utah 1993), requires a defendant to move for a 
withdrawal in the district court before he can 
challenge a plea on appeal, his appeal rights on the 
plea question could be cut off"). Accordingly, 
Copr. £ West 2002 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works 
2002 WL 91642 
(Cite as: 2002 \ \ L 91642, *1 (I tah)) 
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because Reves did not move to withdraw his guiltv 
plea within thirty days after the entry of the plea, we 
lack jurisdiction to address the issue on appeal 
[3] wt 4 Reyes nonetheless argues that under State \ 
Man in 964 P 2d 313, 318~(Utah 1998), we can 
review a guilty plea, regardless of whether a motion 
to withdraw the plea was filed, if plain error or 
exceptional circumstances exist In making this 
argument, Reyes overlooks the fact that we decided 
Mmi in using the pre-amendment version of section 
77-13-6, under which the filing of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea was an issue of preservation, 
not, as is now the case, an issue of jurisdiction 
Marvin 964 P 2d at 318 This court may choose to 
review an issue not properly preserved for plain error 
See State \ Holgate 2000 I T 74 «1 11. 10 P 3d 346 
It cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue 
over which it has no jurisdiction 
*2 * 5 We therefore dismiss Reves' appeal This 
court does not have jurisdiction to entertain Reves' 
rule 11 arguments Further, bv failing to address on 
appeal the denial of his rule 22(e) motion, he has 
waived consideration of that issue 
<| 6 Associate Chief Justice RUSSON, Justice 
DURHAM, Justice DURRANT, and Justice 
WILKINS concur in Chief Justice HOWE'S opinion 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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